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Do Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Laws Affect
Criminal Behavior?
J.J. Prescott University of Michigan
Jonah E. Rockoff Columbia University
Abstract
Sex offenders have become targets of some of the most far-reaching and novel
crime legislation in the United States. Two key innovations have been registration
and notification laws, which, respectively, require that offenders provide iden-
tifying information to law enforcement and mandate that this information be
made fully public. We study how registration and notification affect the fre-
quency and incidence across victims of reported sex offenses. We present evi-
dence that registration reduces the frequency of reported sex offenses against
local victims (for example, neighbors) by keeping police informed about local
sex offenders. Notification also appears to reduce crime, not by disrupting the
criminal conduct of convicted sex offenders, but by deterring nonregistered
offenders. We find that notification may actually increase recidivism. This latter
finding, consistent with the idea that notification imposes severe costs that offset
the benefits to offenders of forgoing criminal activity, is significant, given that
notification’s purpose is recidivism reduction.
1. Introduction
Criminal recidivism poses a serious risk to public safety. As many as two-thirds
of released inmates return to prison within a few years (Langan and Levin 2002),
and data from the National Corrections Reporting Program show that approx-
We thank Charles Calomiris, Ray Fisman, Brandon Garrett, Matthew Gentzkow, Sam Gross, Jim
Hines, Jill Horwitz, Amit Khandelwal, Rick Lempert, Justin McCrary, Rob Mikos, Tom Miles, Daniel
Paravisini, John Pottow, Doug Staiger, Sonja Starr, Betsey Stevenson, and Toni Whited for their
comments and suggestions, as well as seminar participants at Brooklyn Law School, the University
of Chicago Law School, Columbia Business School, University of Houston, Harvard Law School,
Northwestern Law School, Rice University, Stanford Law School, Syracuse University, the University
of Virginia Law School, the 2007 American Law and Economics Association Meeting, the 2007
Canadian Law and Economics Meetings, the 2008 Maryland Crime and Population Dynamics Con-
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imately 40 percent of all criminals sent to U.S. prisons over the last 20 years
were already convicted felons. Recently, victims’ advocates and others have argued
that persons convicted of sex offenses are highly likely to reoffend by committing
another sex crime (Langan, Schmitt, and Durose 2003; Va´squez, Maddan, and
Walker 2008). Although criminal behavior typically declines steeply with age
after an individual’s early 20s, the decline for sex offenses may be more gradual
(Hanson 2002). Partly for these reasons, and because of certain high-profile
crimes that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s, sex offenders have become
the focus of considerable legislation and public spending aimed at reducing their
recidivism.
In the 1990s, two types of laws targeting sex offender behavior proliferated
across the United States. A federal mandate in 1994 (the Jacob Wetterling Act,
named after the victim of a crime in Minnesota) directed states to create registries
containing information about convicted sex offenders for use by law enforce-
ment. In 1996, another federal law (Megan’s Law, named after Megan Kanka,
a victim in New Jersey) began to require that states provide public notification
of the identities and addresses of sex offenders to local residents or other at-risk
groups. The basic motivations for registration and notification, respectively, were
to aid law enforcement in supervising and apprehending sex offenders who might
recidivate and to help local households protect themselves by monitoring and
avoiding offenders in their neighborhoods.
Despite their now widespread use, it is unclear whether sex offender regis-
tration and notification laws have reduced criminal behavior by sex offenders
or whether these laws have advanced any other criminal justice goals (such as
increasing the probability of an arrest, conditional on the report of a sex offense).
It is also unknown whether sex offenders respond to these laws in possibly
unexpected or adverse ways—for example, by selecting different rather than fewer
victims. The answers to these questions are important not only for evaluating
the costs and benefits of registration and notification laws but also for under-
standing how an important group of known criminals responds to changes in
legal sanctions.1
The first studies that sought to measure the impact of registration and no-
tification laws compared the recidivism rates of offenders released just before
and after registration and notification laws became effective in Iowa and Wash-
ference, the 2008 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, and the National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Group on the Economics of Crime. Reid Aronson, Erik Johnson, Rembrand
Koning, Nicholas Lee, Elias Walsh, Oliver Welch, and Julia Zhou provided excellent research assistance.
Prescott gratefully acknowledges the John M. Olin Center for Law and Economics at the University
of Michigan Law School for supporting this project. Rockoff thanks the Paul Milstein Center for
Real Estate at Columbia Business School for research support.
1 Empirical work provides some support for the claim that criminals in general react to changes
in expected punishment (Levitt 1998; Kessler and Levitt 1999; Nagin 1998). However, it is unclear
whether this is true for all types of individuals (see McCrary and Lee [2005] for information on
juvenile offenders), and whether these results extend to sex offenders in particular is unknown
(Bachman, Paternoster, and Ward 1992).
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ington (Schram and Milloy 1995; Adkins, Huff, and Stageberg 2000). Although
neither study found a statistically significant difference in the frequency of sub-
sequent arrests for sex offenses between these two groups, both studies relied
on small samples of offenders. More recent studies examine the relationship
between the timing of legislation and changes in the annual frequency of sex
offenses across states, using data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
(FBI’s) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program (Shao and Li 2006; Agan
2007; Va´squez, Maddan, and Walker 2008). Taken together, these studies find
little evidence that such laws have had any meaningful influence on the overall
number of sex offenses.2
Although we also use the timing of changes in state laws to study the impact
of sex offender registration and notification on criminal behavior, we are able
to offer new evidence regarding a number of different questions because our
analysis differs significantly from previous research in both the data we use and
the methodology we employ. First, we conducted extensive research into the sex
offender legislation of various states and found that prior studies had used
incorrect legal dates or had mischaracterized many of these laws. Understanding
the timing and scope of this body of law is not easy, in part because sex offender
laws have evolved over time as a result of legislative amendments and judicial
decisions.3 We also take advantage of information on the exact dates when laws
became effective by using monthly data and allowing for variation in crime
frequency within years, in contrast to earlier work using annual data.
Second, unlike existing research, our analysis distinguishes between sex of-
fender registration laws and sex offender notification laws. Notification laws
mandate the dissemination of information about sex offenders (for example,
criminal history, physical description, and home address) to the public. Regis-
tration laws, by contrast, require that sex offenders provide these specifics to
some division of government (such as the local police), but the information is
otherwise kept confidential. While registration requirements are intended solely
to aid law enforcement in monitoring offenders and apprehending known re-
cidivists, notification laws aim to reduce crime through greater public awareness
of nearby offenders, which facilitates offender avoidance, public monitoring, and
public identification of a suspect in the event that a convicted sex offender
commits a new crime (Prentky 1996; Pawson 2002; Levenson and D’Amora
2007). We also differentiate among the various features of notification laws,
2 Only Shao and Li (2006) report any evidence that offender registration laws caused a statistically
significant reduction in sex offenses. However, their findings are sensitive to empirical specification,
and they group registration and notification laws together as a single treatment. Agan (2007) offers
some evidence that posting sex offender information on the Internet reduces the number of arrests
for sex offenses, but her results are similarly sensitive and are open to alternative interpretations.
3 We describe the history of sex offender registration and notification laws in Section 2 and provide
basic information about these enactments in Tables A1 and A2.
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including public access to a paper registry, public access to a searchable Internet
site, or active community notification.4
Third, we use variation in the number of offenders who are actually registered
with authorities to identify different ways that registration and notification laws
might influence criminal behavior. For instance, notification laws were designed
to reduce recidivism by making people aware of nearby sex offenders, but no-
tification may also reduce crime by enhancing the punishment for first-time or
nonregistered sex offenders, whose crimes and personal information will be made
public if they are caught and convicted. To distinguish these possibilities, we
exploit the fact that although a notification law should have little effect on
recidivism when a registry is empty, any effect on the behavior of nonregistered
individuals should be invariant to registry size.
Finally, we examine the impact of these laws on the offender-victim relation-
ship mix in addition to the effect, if any, on the overall frequency of reported
sex offenses. Neither registration nor notification was intended to vary the in-
cidence of sex offenses across different types of victims, but some observers
suspect that notification laws might simply displace crime by changing the pop-
ulation of victims that sex offenders target (see Prentky 1996; Filler 2001). We
also study changes in the probabilities that an arrest is made when a sex offense
is reported and that the offense is not prosecuted, despite arrest, because the
victim refuses to cooperate or the prosecution declines to pursue the case.
We find evidence that actual registration of released sex offenders is associated
with a significant decrease in crime. This result is in line with predictions from
a simple model of criminal behavior in which providing information on offenders
to local authorities increases monitoring and therefore the likelihood of pun-
ishment for recidivism. Moreover, the decrease in the overall frequency of re-
ported sex offenses associated with registration is primarily due to reductions
in attacks against local victims who are known to an offender (namely, friends,
acquaintances and neighbors). The frequency of sex offenses committed by
strangers appears to be unaffected by registration, indicating little substitution
by sex offenders from local to more distant victims.
We also find that the implementation of a notification law, regardless of the
number of registered offenders, is associated with a reduction in the frequency
of sex offenses. One potential explanation for this effect, also consistent with
our model, is that notification deters potential (nonregistered) offenders by
increasing the punishment for committing a sex crime. Importantly, we detect
no evidence that notification laws (as opposed to registration laws) curtail crime
by reducing recidivism among convicted sex offenders; the estimated effect of
notification is actually weaker when a state applies the law to a large number
4 Shao and Li (2006) do not differentiate between notification and registration laws. Va´squez,
Maddan, and Walker (2008) explicitly state that they examine both registration and notification laws
but do not distinguish between the two in their empirical work. Agan (2007), on the other hand,
recognizes the distinction with respect to availability of registry information on the Internet but
nevertheless does not include or consider other kinds of notification.
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of offenders. This finding is potentially consistent with a number of explanations.
However, as we argue below, the evidence on balance supports the existence of
a relative utility effect in which convicted sex offenders become more likely to
commit crimes when their information is made public because the associated
psychological, social, or financial costs make crime-free life relatively less
attractive.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the
variation in the timing and scope of state registration and notification laws.
Section 3 illustrates the potential effects of registration and notification using a
simple model of criminal behavior and explains our basic empirical methodology.
Section 4 describes our data. We present our results in Section 5 and robustness
checks in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
2. The Evolution of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws
To characterize sex offender registration and notification laws properly for our
empirical work, we painstakingly researched the evolution of these laws in states
covered in the 1990s by National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS)
data, which we use in our analysis.5 We divide the legal changes that we study
into four categories: registration, public access to a paper registry, Internet registry
availability, and active community notification.
Registration requires that sex offenders provide authorities with identifying
information upon release from custody or probation. Until notification laws
were enacted, this information was treated as confidential. Police increase sur-
veillance of registered offenders and can more easily locate, investigate, and
apprehend them when necessary. The remaining three categories of laws—public
access to a paper registry, Internet registry availability, and active community
notification—are designed to make information about offenders available to the
public rather than to assist the police directly. The public can, in theory, reduce
sex offender recidivism by avoiding convicted offenders and reporting suspicious
behavior.
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, states have typically progressed from
using basic registration laws to relying on more restrictive and varied forms of
public access and from restrictive public access to publication of sex offender
5 See the Appendix. Determining accurate effective dates proved difficult. When we compare our
dates to those used by Shao and Li (2006), Agan (2007), and Va´squez, Maddan, and Walker (2008),
we find a low rate of agreement. Among the 50 states and the District of Columbia, there are only
12 instances (14 instances) in which all studies agree on the exact date (calendar year) that registration
became effective. For example, Utah’s first generally applicable sex offender registry became effective
May 10, 1983. Shao and Li (2006) use May 19, 1987, a date that we cannot locate in legislative
history but that is close to the April 27 effective date of a 1987 law that recodified and amended
the registration law. Agan (2007) uses July 1, 1984, which likely refers to a 1984 law that also amended
the original 1983 enactment, but the effective date for that law was February 16, 1984. Va´squez,
Maddan, and Walker (2008) use 1996, when Utah passed a notification law granting public access
to registry information.
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Figure 1. Effective dates of registration and notification laws in 15 early National Incident-
Based Reporting System (NIBRS) states.
registration information on the Internet.6 Many states also implemented active
community notification regimes, such as announcing the release or arrival of
sex offenders in local newspapers.7 At each new stage, states also determined
whether to make their laws or the changes to their laws retroactive in their
application. Retroactivity provisions specify which offenders are subject to these
laws in terms of the timing of an offender’s conviction or release from custody.8
We use all of this cross-state variation—in exact timing, scope, retroactivity, and
registry size—to identify the causal effects of registration and notification laws.
Figure 1 shows the effective dates of registration laws, laws allowing public
6 Sex offender Web registries typically allow the public to search for offenders using an individual’s
name or alias or to search for all offenders living near a specific address.
7 Other examples of active community notification include personal visits made by police officers
or letters sent to former victims or other persons considered to be at risk, as well as opt-in provisions,
which allow citizens to request notification if a certain sex offender or one satisfying certain conditions
is released or moves.
8 For example, the registration law in Massachusetts, effective October 1996, required anyone
convicted of a qualifying sex offense on or after August 1, 1981, to register. As a result, nearly 8,000
offenders were registered when the registry became effective (Boston Globe 1996). Other states made
their laws prospective. For instance, Michigan’s registration law, effective October 1, 1995, required
registration of individuals convicted or released on or after that date. As a result, when the law
became effective, Michigan’s registry was empty.
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access to a paper registry, and laws requiring active community notification, as
well as the dates on which substantially complete Internet registries became
publicly accessible for our NIBRS states (see also Tables A1 and A2) and the
year in which agencies from each state began reporting to NIBRS. Although sex
offender laws have evolved in a similar fashion from state to state, Figure 1
demonstrates that the timing and content of these laws vary considerably. For
example, Iowa began registration and (limited) public access simultaneously in
1995 but did not have any form of active notification until 1998 or an Internet
site until 2000. Texas, by contrast, began registration in 1991, instituted public
access and active notification in 1995, and launched an Internet site in 1999.
Endogeneity in the timing of the adoption of these laws is unlikely to be a
problem for several reasons. First, unlike with most criminal laws, where rising
crime rates might lead to increases in penalties or police spending, many state
sex offender laws were passed quickly in response to one or two well-publicized
and usually gruesome incidents. Indeed, many sex offender enactments are
named after the victim who sparked the legislative effort, and sex offense rates
(like rates of other crimes) actually declined in the 1990s, the period during
which most of these laws were passed. Second, federal mandates passed in 1994
and 1996 (motivated in part by specific crimes against individual children in
Minnesota and New Jersey) required states to institute registration and notifi-
cation regimes. These federal laws left states with discretion as to substance and
timing but had minimum requirements and imposed deadlines. Finally, the
timing of the state laws was also partly dictated by preexisting legislative schedules
that were unrelated to offense trends (for example, the North Dakota and Texas
legislatures meet regularly only once every 2 years).9
3. Conceptual Model and Empirical Framework
To generate testable hypotheses and to aid in the interpretation of our empirical
results, we consider a simple model of criminal behavior. Criminal offenses
committed by individual i against victim j are governed by a victim-specific
probability of punishment ( ) and targeting costs ( ), a level of punishmentp cij ij
if convicted ( ), and utility from committing crime relative to engaging in legalfi
behavior ( ) that is invariant across victims.10 Victim specifics are important inui
9 Whether a sex offender law is made retroactive is also unlikely to be endogenous to crime rates.
Criminal laws with retroactive features can violate the U.S. Constitution or its state counterparts.
The decision whether to make a law retroactive in any particular state turns in significant part on
governing judicial opinions in that state.
10 This model is adapted from the structure of Becker (1968). The utility term is an analogue to
Becker’s (1968, p. 177) concept of the individual’s “willingness to commit an illegal act.” The
assumption that the relative utility of criminal behavior is invariant across victims may not be true
in a strict sense (a particular offender, for example, may prefer targeting a stranger to a neighbor,
conditional on actual costs), but any variation can be reinterpreted as a difference in victim-specific
targeting costs. In any event, because we focus on the changes in these terms caused by registration
and notification laws, the assumption is not critical to motivating or interpreting our empirical work.
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this model because the sex offender laws that we consider were intended to make
it difficult for offenders to victimize people in their vicinity—neighbors, ac-
quaintances, and the like. By assumption, the number of offenses is increasing
in the relative utility of crime commission ( ) (or decreasing in the relativeui
attractiveness of choosing legal behavior) and decreasing in the costs of targeting
a victim ( ), punishment probability ( ), and punishment severity ( ):c p fij ij i
O p O (c , p , f , u ). (1)ij ij ij ij i i
Registration and notification laws are likely to influence the number of offenses
through several specific channels. Registration may enhance the ability of police
to monitor and apprehend registered sex offenders, increasing the probability
of punishment ( ) for registrants—in particular, when registered offenders targetpij
neighbors because local police will be more likely to connect victims to known
offenders. Registration may also affect forward-looking, nonregistered individuals
because punishment ( ) now includes a higher future probability of detection.11fi
However, as long as registry information remains confidential, registration alone
should not alter the costs of targeting victims ( ) or the utility of committingcij
a crime ( ).ui
Notification—via physical access to registry information, an Internet registry,
or active notification—may also affect criminal behavior. With a notification law
in place, punishment for sex offenses includes the public airing of a sex offender’s
personal information and criminal history. This publicity can lead to negative
consequences for sex offenders, including loss of employment, housing, or social
ties; harassment; and psychological costs such as increased stress, loneliness, and
depression (see Zevitz and Farkas 2000a; Tewksbury 2005; Levenson and Cotter
2005). Consequently, for nonregistered sex offenders, the passage of a notification
law increases punishment severity ( ) because any subsequent sex offense con-fi
viction would newly subject such offenders to this sort of notoriety.12
By contrast, registered sex offenders living under notification regimes, whatever
their behavior, already suffer from these kinds of publicity costs. Although com-
mitting another offense may prolong an offender’s registration term by adding
time in the distant future—the federal minimum registration period is 10 years—
many states have lifetime registration for violent sex offenders, and some states
have lifetime registration for virtually all sex offenses. Moreover, the conse-
quences of notification (for example, difficulty of finding employment) may
cause registered sex offenders to commit more crimes than they would have
otherwise (Freeman-Longo 1996; Prentky 1996; Winick 1998; Presser and Gun-
11 Implementing a registry might also decrease the probability of punishment ( ) for first-timepij
offenders if the police shift resources toward monitoring registrants and away from detection of new
crimes. Unfortunately, we cannot determine whether this occurs.
12 We use the terms “nonregistered” and “potential” offenders to refer to individuals who have
never committed a sex offense, individuals who have committed sex offenses but who have never
been convicted, and individuals who were previously convicted of sex offenses but who, for some
reason, are not required to register (for example, offenders released before the passage of a nonre-
troactive registration law).
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nison 1999; Edwards and Hensley 2001). In the context of our model, punishment
( ) would remain constant (or increase slightly) for registered sex offenders,fi
while the relative utility of criminal behavior ( ) would increase because law-ui
abiding behavior would typically involve more harassment, stress, loneliness, and
unemployment.13
In addition, by allowing local residents, friends, and acquaintances to identify
and avoid registered sex offenders, notification may increase the costs for these
offenders of targeting this particular subset of potential victims ( ). Indeed, acij
major motivation for the passage of the federal Megan’s Law was the belief that
Megan Kanka would have avoided her fate had her parents been notified of her
eventual attacker’s presence in the neighborhood. However, it is unclear whether
an increase in the costs of targeting a subset of potential victims reduces the
overall number of sex offenses. Notification may instead “accomplish nothing
more than changing the neighborhood in which the offender looks for victims”
(Prentky 1996, p. 295), simply displacing crime rather than reducing it.14
Although we lack information on whether any particular crime in our data
was committed by a registered sex offender, we can use the ideas described above
to identify and distinguish the different effects of registration and notification
regimes on the criminal behavior of both registered and nonregistered offenders
by using variation in the number of individuals on state sex offender registries.
Specifically, any effect of registration on the overall frequency of crime due to
an increase in the probability of punishment should be small when relatively
few offenders are registered and should grow in magnitude with the size of the
registry. The potential impact of registration on the punishment level ( ) forfi
forward-looking, nonregistered individuals, however, would not depend (or
would depend very little) on the size of the registry. Likewise, notification may
increase the level of punishment ( ) facing nonregistered sex offenders, reducingfi
aggregate crime irrespective of the size of the sex offender registry.15 Notification
may also have several offsetting effects on the behavior of registered sex offenders
by increasing the costs of targeting local victims ( ), increasing the probabilitycij
of punishment for local crimes ( ), slightly increasing the level of punishmentpij
13 Although we conceive of these burdens on offenders as increasing the relative utility of criminal
behavior, one could also think of them as reducing punishment levels because they make life in
prison seem relatively more attractive. Either interpretation of a higher leads to an increase in theui
number of offenses committed by a registrant in our model.
14 In addition to increasing the costs of targeting local victims, notification may increase vigilance
and the monitoring of a registered sex offender’s actions in his neighborhood. This community-
policing effect (Lieb 1996) could increase the likelihood of apprehension if an offender attacks a
local victim. Again, if the likelihood of punishment increases only for crimes against local victims,
offenders may simply offend in other neighborhoods. Crime displacement has been an important
consideration in other empirical research on the response of criminals to changes in their environ-
ments (Jacob, Lefgren, and Moretti 2004; Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004; Iyengar 2007).
15 This response may in turn affect the distribution of offender-victim relationships if an offender’s
probability of punishment is correlated with his relationships to victims. For example, the reporting
rate to police and, hence, the probability of punishment may be lower for sex crimes committed
against children by members of their family (Filler 2001).
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( ), and increasing the relative utility of crime commission ( ). The overall tallyf ui i
of these effects for the level of crime is indeterminate, but, again, any net impact
is likely to grow in magnitude with registry size.
To conduct this analysis, we estimate the following reduced-form equation:
Crime p a  g  lXjt j t jt (2)
s s s s s D [b Rg  b Nt  (b Rg  b Nt )# RgSize ]  . j 0 t 1 t 2 t 3 t jt jt
s
is a measure of crime frequency (for example, offenses per 10,000 people)Crimejt
for reporting area j in time period t. A reporting area fixed effect ( ) capturesaj
any persistent heterogeneity in crime across areas, and a time effect ( ) accountsgt
for secular changes in crime over time. We control for time-varying reporting area
characteristics ( ) that are likely to influence crime levels. Vectors ands sX Rg Ntjt t t
indicate whether state s had a sex offender registry or a notification law in place
during time period t, and is a measure of registry size in area j in timeRgSizejt
period t. The indicator denotes that reporting area j is located in state s.sDj
The coefficient represents the deterrence effect of a registration law on theb0
criminal behavior of nonregistered offenders and should be negative if the re-
quirement to register that follows a first sex offense conviction makes punishment
for subsequent crimes more likely.16 A stronger prediction of our model, however,
is that should be negative. Registration reduces crime by increasing the prob-b2
ability that each registered sex offender is punished if he commits another crime
and therefore should reduce crime by more when there are more registered sex
offenders—that is, when the registry is large.17
The coefficient captures the effect of notification on nonregistered sexb1
offender behavior and should also be negative, reflecting the significant threat
that the consequences of notification pose to the well-being of nonregistered
16 Registration laws in Massachusetts and South Carolina retroactively affected large numbers of
released offenders, and Texas and Utah joined the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS)
well after their registries had begun. As a consequence, the identification of —the effect on crimeb0
frequency of a registry with no registrants—relies on less in-sample variation than the number of
states in our sample suggests.
17 In theory, registry size could influence the behavior of nonregistered offenders if they respond
either to contemporaneous registry size or the expected size of the registry in the future. In that
case, and would embody mixes of deterrence and recidivism reduction. Potential offendersb b2 3
might believe that resources devoted to tracking offenders would outpace or, instead, lag behind the
growth in registry size; that a large registry would overwhelm the public with information or,
alternatively, make the public more aware; or that growth in the number of registrants would reduce
the stigma against sex offenders or just make it worse. We know of no evidence that potential
offenders consider or are even aware of registry sizes in determining their behavior, and to us it
seems improbable that more than a few of them have any such knowledge or take into account such
information. Still, although we interpret and as recidivism effects, some small portion of theb b2 3
effects that we identify may be attributable to nonregistered offender behavior.
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individuals.18 By contrast, there is no clear prediction for the sign of , givenb3
the potentially offsetting effects notification may have on the behavior of those
individuals who are already subject to its requirements. Finding that is negativeb3
would signify that notification reduces the availability of victims and would
bolster claims made by the proponents of these laws that they protect the public
from sex offender recidivism. However, if offenders shift to other victims or
commit more crimes because public disgrace has made criminal activity relatively
more attractive than law-abiding behavior, our estimate of could be close tob3
zero or even positive.19
We can also use equation (2) to examine the impact of registration and no-
tification on the distribution of relationships between sex offenders and their
victims (for example, friend, neighbor, or stranger). As a general matter, reg-
istration and notification laws apply equally to all covered sex offenses and
without regard to the type of offender-victim relationship involved. Therefore,
any increase in punishment for nonregistered offenders ( and ) should, allb b0 1
else equal, produce similar effects across all relationship types. With respect to
the behavior of registered sex offenders, however, a registry’s crime-reducing
impact ( ) should be greater for offenses against local victims as a result ofb2
increased local monitoring, with a smaller effect for distant-relationship offenses
or, potentially, a positive effect if the law merely induces substitution away from
local victims. How the effect of notification laws on registered sex offenders’
behavior ( ) should vary across offender-victim relationship types is unclear. Ifb3
the increased cost of targeting local victims predominates, we should observe
fewer crimes against local victims and either no change or an increase in the
number of crimes against strangers. However, if growth in the relative utility of
18 The identification of relies significantly on out-of-sample variation because only a few of theb1
NIBRS states passed a statute requiring full notification at the same time as their registration law,
and most states did not do so until several years after their registration laws became effective.
Nevertheless, our data do include a considerable number of observations in which the number of
registered offenders per 10,000 people is quite low relative to the sample mean. For example, the
sample mean of registry size among observations with a full notification law in place is 17.3 offenders
per 10,000 people, while the 10th percentile is approximately 5.7 offenders per 10,000 people, and
the 10th percentile within each state is equal to or less than six offenders per 10,000 people in seven
of the 15 NIBRS states. Our estimates suggest that enacting a notification law with this low number
of registered individuals would still have a negative and statistically significant effect on the frequency
of sex crime.
19 One concern with the use of registry size is the potential for bias due to reverse causation
because registry size is determined in part by the number of sex offenses committed in the past. In
practice, however, registry size is primarily a function of how long the registry has been in existence,
the degree to which the registration law applied retroactively to previously released offenders, the
inclusion or exclusion of offenders convicted of less serious crimes, and overall compliance with the
registration law. In addition, the lag with which new offenders are added to the registry is likely to
be quite long. For individuals sent to prison in 2002 whose first listed offense was rape, sexual assault,
or child molestation, the median sentence lengths were 120, 72, and 68 months, respectively, and
the fraction with a sentence of 1 year or less was 1.7, 2.5, and 1.8 percent, respectively (authors’
calculations using data from the 2002 National Corrections Reporting Program [U.S. Department
of Justice 2006]). Thus, only a very small amount of growth in registry size is due to recent convictions,
and any short-run change in the frequency of sex offenses driven by other factors is unlikely to be
correlated with short-run changes in registry size.
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crime commission is paramount, an increase in the frequency of sex offenses
across all victim types seems probable because the change in the relative utility
of crime commission is unlikely to be specific to victim type.
When examining arrests and dropped cases, we use incident-level data to
estimate equations that are similar in form to equation (2). For example,
Arrest p a  g  lXijt j t ijt (3)
s s s s s D [d Rg  d Nt  (d Rg  d Nt )# RgSize ]  . i 0 t 1 t 2 t 3 t ijt ijt
s
An incident in reporting area j is denoted by i. Incident-level variables ( )Xijt
include details about the crime known to police (for example, characteristics of
the victim, the offender, and their relationship; the offense type; and the number
of victims and offenders involved). The other variables are incident-level ana-
logues to the regressors in equation (2).
When predicting the effect of registration and notification laws on arrest
patterns, police behavior becomes as relevant as any response by potential of-
fenders. Neither type of law should directly influence the likelihood of arrest for
nonregistered individuals ( and ) through changes in police conduct because,d d0 1
by definition, police do not have any special knowledge of the identities or
whereabouts of these individuals and presumably are not monitoring them.20 If
the punishment level (f ) increases, however, potential offenders may offend less,
substituting away from crimes against marginal victims for which the probability
of punishment (p) is relatively high. This prospect suggests that any change in
the likelihood of arrest ( and ) should mirror the direction of any effects ofd d0 1
these laws on offense frequency ( and ).b b0 1
The predicted impact on arrest rates for sex offenses committed by registered
sex offenders is also ambiguous. Registration should increase arrest rates through
enhanced monitoring and easier apprehension ( ), but registrants may respondd2
to their registration by forgoing offenses against victims when being arrested is
relatively more likely. Therefore, the effect on arrest rates should be positive if
there is no change in recidivism but small if registered offenders offend less or
select victims such that the probability of punishment for any crime remains
low. A similar analysis applies to notification. A direct effect ( ) on registeredd3
offenders, by way of community policing, should increase the probability of
arrest. However, if local victims use notification information to avoid known
criminals, becoming more costly to target (c), offenders may attack only that
subset of local victims that ensures the probability of punishment will be suf-
ficiently low, causing average observed arrest rates to decrease. In addition, if
notification renders legal behavior relatively less attractive (u), arrest probabilities
20 If monitoring registrants or responding to citizen complaints about registrants becomes so
expensive or time consuming that the police are not able to investigate crimes or perform other
activities likely to deter crime, then nonregistered sex offenders might eventually perceive these
changes and react to the reduced probability of punishment by committing more crimes.
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may increase as offenders become willing to commit comparatively brash crimes
for which the probability of punishment was previously too great.
In general, therefore, the impact of these policies on arrest probabilities de-
pends fundamentally on the effect of registration and notification laws on overall
crime frequency. As we explain below, we find little evidence of a direct con-
nection between these laws and our arrest variables, but the patterns that emerge
from our analysis of arrest data (and of dropped cases) do serve to confirm the
robustness of our offense frequency findings.21 Table 1 provides a summary of
the predicted relationships between the registration and notification variables in
equations (2) and (3) and the model parameters and outcomes of interest.
4. Data
Our primary data source, NIBRS, is part of the FBI’s UCR Program but
presents several opportunities for research that are unavailable with standard
UCR data. First, NIBRS links information on victims, offenders, and arrestees
for each incident. As a result, we can examine the impact of registration and
notification laws on the relationship mix of offenders and victims and on the
ability of police to secure an arrest for a reported crime, in addition to measuring
the effects that these laws have on reported crime frequency. Second, the timing
information for each incident is superior in NIBRS, which allows us to better
exploit within-year variation in the effective dates of sex offender laws in our
empirical work. Although UCR data are available by month, they only contain
information on when an incident was reported, whereas NIBRS data supply the
date on which an incident occurred.22
The NIBRS data do have significant limitations, however. First, like most crime
data, NIBRS data contain only information on incidents recorded by police.
Changes in reported crime may be driven by true changes in victimization or
by changes in reporting behavior. (We return to this issue when interpreting our
findings.) A second limitation is that NIBRS data started to become available
21 We also examine cases that are dropped by prosecutors because of noncooperation by victims
or for other reasons. This information is included in NIBRS and is of interest to us, but it is not
part of our model; therefore, we leave the discussion of these issues until after we present our main
results.
22 If the date of the incident is not known to the police—this occurs for approximately 20 percent
of sex offenses—then NIBRS reports the date on which the crime was reported. Unfortunately,
NIBRS does not retain both dates, so we cannot directly measure the lag between occurrence and
report. However, we can get a sense of the gap between incident and report dates by using the fact
that a subset of crimes reported in NIBRS took place in a prior calendar year (that is, some crimes
that occurred in year T are reported in the data for year T  1). We examined all sex offenses
(excluding 2005) by the calendar month in which they took place and measured the fraction reported
in the following year. Of the sex offenses that took place in December, 11 percent were reported the
next year, while the corresponding data for November, July, and March are 7, 2, and 1 percent,
respectively. Thus, although most crimes are reported within a few months of their occurrence, a
nontrivial fraction are reported with considerable lag. In any event, our results are not sensitive to
excluding crimes for which an incident date is unavailable.
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only in the 1990s, and only a subset of states participate in the program. In
1995, which was 1 year after the federal government required that states create
sex offender registries and 1 year before it required that registry information be
made public, there were just nine NIBRS states. By 1998, eight more states had
joined the program. By 2004, a total of 30 states were collecting NIBRS data.
Our analysis focuses on the 15 states that were participating in NIBRS by 1998:
Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ne-
braska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Vir-
ginia.23 Third, within each state, the number of reporting agencies (hereafter,
ORIs, referring to the originating agency identifiers used by NIBRS to uniquely
identify each of its law enforcement data sources) generally increases over time.
We include ORI fixed effects in all of our regressions to account for the growth
in the number of reporting agencies over time and to control for any persistent
heterogeneity in ORI characteristics.24
In NIBRS, multiple offenses may be reported in a single incident, and so we
classify an incident as a sex offense if any of the reported offenses falls into one
of three sex offense categories: rape and sexual assault, sexual molestation (“forc-
ible fondling” in NIBRS), or other nonviolent sex offenses (incest and statutory
rape).25 We characterize the varied relationships between victims and offenders
by dividing offenders into three groups based on the intimacy of their relationship
with the victim: close, near, and stranger. The close group includes family mem-
bers, significant others, and friends; the near group includes neighbors, ac-
quaintances, and offenders who are otherwise known to the victim; and the
stranger group includes offenders described as strangers and offenders whose
relationship to the victim was not known by the victim (which is distinct from
“missing” in the data).
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the sample of incidents that we examine.26
For purposes of comparison, we also include NIBRS information on ordinary
23 These states are geographically diverse, but we lack data from the far West (for example, Cal-
ifornia) and the deep South (for example, Mississippi). Tennessee and West Virginia also joined
NIBRS in 1998. Both had passed registration and notification laws by that time, however, so we did
not include them.
24 Although NIBRS surveys reporting agencies (or ORIs) on a monthly basis, an ORI may not
submit a complete accounting of incidents each month. We exerted considerable effort, a full de-
scription of which is given in the Appendix, to ensure that our results are not driven by reporting
errors.
25 Incidents of non-sex-related crimes are used in our analysis to control for time-varying factors
that may cause changes in crime rates in an ORI over time. We use ordinary assaults and other
crimes as measures of violent crime reasonably similar to sex offenses and of the overall crime rate,
respectively. We classify an incident as an assault if at least one of the offenses was an assault but
none of the offenses was a sex offense. This latter condition affected a small number of incidents:
only .3 percent of incidents with a sex offense also involved an assault, and just .02 percent of assaults
also included a sex offense. By definition, incidents of other crimes do not contain a sex offense or
an ordinary assault.
26 Additional details are presented in Table A3, which provides summary statistics for the aggregated
(to the ORI-month level) NIBRS data, the legal data, and the county and state demographic data
that we use in most of our empirical work. The samples in Table A3 are identical to the data used
in the regression analyses reported in Tables 3, 4, and 6.
Table 2
Summary Statistics for Reported Crime Incidents
Sex Offenses Assaults
Incidents in sample 328,260 4,757,118
Rape and sexual assault (%) 37.9 N.A.
Forced fondling (%) 41.8 N.A.
Other nonviolent sex offenses (%) 20.3 N.A.
Incidents with report date (%) 18.9 12.8
Incidents leading to arrest (%) 25.7 37.3
Average days to arrest 24.3 13.7
Prosecution drops charges (%) 7.1 4.8
Victim refuses to cooperate (%) 5.1 6.6
Offender-victim relationship (%):
Immediate family 11.5 24.9
Extended family 9.3 3.7
Stepfamily 4.7 1.3
Friend 7.0 2.8
Significant other 8.0 17.6
Acquaintance 31.0 23.7
Neighbor 2.4 1.8
Otherwise known 9.6 9.3
Stranger 8.4 9.7
Relationship unknown 11.8 10.2
Missing relationship information 4.3 4.5
Victim characteristics (%):
Female 86.5 58.4
White 77.6 68.2
Black 17.9 28.3
Age 0–4 8.7 .7
Age 5–9 14.8 1.6
Age 10–14 27.1 6.9
Age 15–19 23.8 15.3
Age 20–29 13.1 30.2
Age 30–39 7.2 24.0
Age 40–49 3.6 14.5
Age 50–65 1.1 5.6
Age 65 .5 1.3
Offender characteristics (%):
Male 95.9 76.8
White 69.0 61.5
Black 24.1 33.9
Age 0–9 2.3 .5
Age 10–14 11.2 6.2
Age 15–19 20.1 15.9
Age 20–29 25.5 31.3
Age 30–39 20.5 25.4
Age 40–49 12.0 14.5
Age 50–65 6.5 5.1
Age 65 1.9 .9
Note. The sample includes all sex offenses and assaults reported in 15 National Incident-
Based Reporting System states (Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, and Virginia). Relationships total more than 100 percent because some in-
cidents involved more than one relationship. N.A. p not applicable.
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assaults. Assaults are more common than sex offenses, with more than 14 assaults
occurring for every sex offense. Reporting of incident dates, arrest rates, and
time until arrest is quite different for the two types of crime. The frequency with
which incident dates are not reported (and for which only a report date is
available) is higher for sex offenses. Arrests are less common for sex offenses,
and the time to arrest—conditional on the arrest occurring at least 1 day after
the incident—is considerably longer.
The relationships between offenders and victims are similar for sex offenses
and assaults, with family members and acquaintances as the two most common
categories of offenders. The overall fraction of (reported) incidents with an
acquaintance is somewhat higher for sex offenses, but sex offense incidents are
less common between all family members (26 versus 30 percent) and significant
others. For both sex offenses and ordinary assaults, the victim claimed that the
offender was a stranger or that the relationship to the offender was unknown
in approximately 20 percent of incidents.
Assaults and sex offenses differ significantly in terms of victim demographic
characteristics. Although 51 percent of sex offense victims in our sample were
younger than 15 years old, the corresponding figure for assault victims is only
9 percent. Sex offense victims are also more likely to be female and white.
Offender characteristics also differ across the two types of offenses. The age
distribution of sex offenders is wider than it is for people who commit assault,
with larger fractions of total offenders in both the youngest and oldest age groups.
Sex offenders are also much more likely to be male and somewhat more likely
to be white.
Finally, we classify each incident by the registration and notification laws in
effect and by the number of registered offenders on the date that the crime took
place. When analyzing data aggregated to the ORI-month level, our legal variables
(including information about the public availability of a state’s Internet registry)
reflect the law on the 15th day of the calendar month. Complete historical data
on the size of registries are unavailable (particularly for early years), but we have
gathered extensive information on state registry sizes at many points in time
and on county registry sizes at a single point in time. Under the assumption
that registries grew smoothly once established, we use these data to estimate how
registry sizes evolved during our sample period. We provide details about this
estimation procedure in the Appendix.
5. Crime Frequency and Relationship Mix Results
We estimate the effects of registration and notification laws on sex offense
frequency and on the mix of offender-victim relationships using the empirical
approach outlined in Section 3. All regressions include ORI, year, and month
fixed effects as well as controls for annual per capita income, unemployment
levels, poverty rates, and the fraction of the population in five ethnicity categories
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and 5-year age categories at the county level. In addition, we test the sensitivity
of our estimates to the inclusion of the number of ordinary assaults and the
number of other crimes committed per 10,000 people. We view these two controls
as proxies for ORI-specific time-varying factors that influence crime rates and
may be correlated with our legal variables of interest. Although we do not report
the estimated coefficients for these controls, both assault rates and other crime
rates are always positively related to sex offense rates, and both relationships are
highly statistically significant.27
The registry indicator signifies that the state has an active offender registry,
and registry size is measured using our empirical estimates, as explained in the
Appendix.28 Although registry laws are fairly uniform, notification laws can be
categorized into three broad types: requiring public access to a paper registry,
making an Internet registry publicly available, or mandating active community
notification. Within these categories, we focus on statutes that imply the “full”
availability of sex offender information, which means that access was not subject
to the discretion of local authorities and that the public could obtain information
about local offenders in general, rather than being limited to inquiries about
specific people. Full Internet availability indicates that the Internet registry was
online and substantially complete.29 Full active notification denotes a law that
affirmatively requires the government to deliver specific sex offender information
either to the offender’s neighbors or to local media for publication. Figure 2
shows the timing of the effective dates of these laws. In the regressions presented
27 Including assaults and other crimes as controls for time-varying unobservable factors in our
regressions may be problematic if the frequency of either set of offenses is itself affected by registration
or notification laws, which could happen, for example, if assaults or other crimes are substitutes or
complements to sex offenses in the eyes of offenders, in terms of the decision to commit crimes, or
in the eyes of victims, in terms of whether and how to report crimes. However, we present our
findings from specifications with and without these controls in Table 3, and their inclusion has little
influence on our results. A complete set of results without assault rates or other crime rates included
as covariates is available from the authors upon request.
28 Internet and active notification laws do not necessarily apply to all registered sex offenders. In
our sample, as of 2008, seven of the 15 states that we study listed 100 percent of their registered
offenders on their Internet registries, and 10 listed more than 95 percent of their registered offenders.
However, five states (Colorado, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and North Dakota) listed significantly
less than 95 percent of their public Internet registries. Overestimating the number of registered
offenders who are subject to a certain notification provision should affect only our estimates of the
coefficient on the interaction with registry size of that notification provision, and, if anything, the
overestimate should bias these results toward zero (making our estimates a lower bound). To verify
this logic, we ran regressions using a rough proxy—the ratio of individuals on a state’s Internet
registry to the total number of sex offenders registered in that state as of 2008—to construct a
separate registry size for the interactions with Internet availability and active notification. As predicted,
our initial estimates grew in magnitude and retained similar statistical significance levels. These results
are available from the authors upon request.
29 We located news articles suggesting that the Internet registries in seven states were incomplete
when they were launched—that is, missing information on a significant share of the offenders required
to be listed. For five of these states, we discovered sources indicating when the Internet registry was
complete, was expected to be complete, or was expected to be virtually complete. Where we have
an indication of incompleteness but no notice of completion (two states), we consider the Internet
registry complete 3 months after launch or our last evidence of incompleteness.
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Figure 2. Effective dates of registration and full notification laws in 15 early National
Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) states.
below, we define a notification law as being in effect if at least one of these full
versions of notification is in place and operative.30
The unit of observation in our analysis is an ORI-month cell, and the de-
pendent variable is measured as the annualized number of incidents per 10,000
people covered by the ORI (we multiply the monthly incident rates by 12 for
ease of interpretation).31 The regressions are weighted by ORI population cov-
erage so that the coefficients reflect average changes in crime risk faced by a
typical person covered by the NIBRS sample and to account for likely hetero-
30 One complication of this approach is that two states in our sample (Texas and Ohio) had
registration and at least one full notification law in place before the start of their NIBRS data periods.
As a consequence, these states do not contribute to the identification of the effects of these laws on
the behavior of nonregistered sex offenders. Eliminating these states from our analysis, however, has
little effect on our results. We report findings from a limited 13-state sample in Table A4.
31 Studies of crime frequency often examine the natural log of crime as an outcome (Shao and Li
2006); however, this transformation is problematic in our case because we use monthly data from
areas of limited size, and therefore we have many ORI-month observations with no sex offenses.
Nevertheless, for comparison purposes, we also estimate regressions in which the dependent variable
is the natural log of offenses plus one per 10,000 people. The results of the two specifications are
alike in sign and significance. The similarity of the results is not surprising given that we weight our
analysis by covered population and so rely more on more heavily populated areas that are less likely
to have months without the occurrence of at least one sex offense.
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Table 3
Effects of Registration and Notification on Sex Offense Frequency
Sex Offenses
per 10,000 People
ln(Sex Offenses
per 10,000 People)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Registry Effective .405 .362 .032 .029
(.362) (.439) (.029) (.033)
[.29] [.43] [.30] [.40]
Registry Effective # Registry Size .081 .098 .006 .007
(.034) (.04) (.003) (.003)
[.04] [.03] [.05] [.03]
Notification 1.155 1.171 .078 .079
(.369) (.406) (.028) (.029)
[.01] [.02] [.02] [.02]
Notification # Registry Size .079 .082 .006 .006
(.029) (.032) (.002) (.002)
[.02] [.03] [.03] [.04]
Controls for assaults and other crimes No Yes No Yes
Mean offense frequency 9.17
SD 9.70
Mean registry size 15.97
SD 11.18
R2 .35 .36 .68 .68
Note. The unit of observation is a reporting agency (ORI)-month cell. Registry Size is empirically estimated
from registry data and is measured as the number of offenders per 10,000 people. Notification laws represent
full access by the public to information on offenders. All regressions control for county income and
demographics and ORI, year, and month fixed effects and are weighted by the covered population in each
ORI. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses, and p-values are in brackets. N p 210,209.
skedasticity.32 Finally, because our sample includes a small number of states and
our registry size variable is empirically estimated, using customary ordinary least
squares estimates of standard errors or even clustering by state can lead to
incorrect statistical inferences (Donald and Lang 2007; Cameron, Gelbach, and
Miller 2008; Murphy and Topel 1985). To correct our standard errors for both
of these problems, we use a bootstrap procedure we describe in the Appendix.
Table 3 reports the estimated effects of registration and notification on the
frequency of sex offenses. We find no evidence that registries deter nonregistered
sex offenders. In fact, the estimated impact of a new (empty) sex offender registry
on the frequency of sex offenses is positive, although imprecisely measured. We
do find evidence, however, that requiring registration reduces recidivism, pre-
sumably by increasing monitoring, and therefore increasing the likelihood of
32 To illustrate the heteroskedasticity issue, suppose we have two ORIs, each with 10 sex offenses
per 10,000 people in a given month, but one ORI has 1,000 people and another has 100,000. These
two values correspond roughly to the 5th and 95th percentile of the covered population among ORIs
in our sample. The smaller ORI in this example had only one actual sex offense in that month, and
its sex offense rate would drop to 0 per 10,000 people if there were no crimes the following month
(which is quite likely to happen given sampling variation). By contrast, the large ORI had 100 sex
offenses during the month and is much less likely to drop to a rate of 0 per 10,000 people because
of sampling error.
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punishment that potential recidivists face. Specifically, the estimated coefficient
for Registry Size is negative and statistically significant, as predicted by our model.
The data in column 2 of Table 3 imply that each additional sex offender registered
per 10,000 people reduces the annual number of sex offenses reported per 10,000
people by .098 crime. This is a substantial reduction (1.07 percent) that, if
accurate, supports placing information about sex offenders in the hands of local
law enforcement in order to combat recidivism.
Notification laws also appear to affect the overall frequency of sex offenses,
but the pattern of results presented in Table 3 does not correspond to the
predictions furnished by proponents of notification. The estimated effect of the
existence of a notification law on the number of offenses is negative and sta-
tistically significant. If our identifying assumptions are correct, the data in column
2 suggest that notification laws reduce the frequency of crime by 1.17 crimes
per 10,000 people per year (approximately 12.8 percent) by deterring individuals
who are not currently registered as sex offenders.33 However, the estimate for
the interaction of Notification and Registry Size is positive and statistically sig-
nificant. In the context of our model, this finding implies that any beneficial
effect of registration on recidivism is dampened by the use of notification, and
it signals that the punitive aspects of notification laws may have perverse con-
sequences. Specifically, a basic trade-off may exist: whereas some nonregistered
or potential offenders may be deterred by the threat of notification and its
associated costs, the ex post imposition of those sanctions on convicted offenders
may make them more likely to recidivate.34
Assuming that our evidence is accurate and our interpretation is valid, how
should a legislature approach this trade-off between deterrence and recidivism?
For a simple back-of-the-envelope analysis, imagine a state that must decide
whether to enact a registration law, whether to enact a notification law, and how
many offenders should be covered by these laws. We find that the threat of
registration has a statistically insignificant positive effect on the number of annual
33 Under the assumption that the passage of a law may not be well known, we use the effective
dates of these laws to estimate the deterrence effects of registration and notification. In a separate
analysis, we use enactment dates to estimate these deterrence effects and effective dates only to
estimate the consequences of these laws for recidivism. The intuition behind this approach is that
once these laws are enacted, the commission of a sex offense by a potential offender may subject
him to registration and/or notification requirements in the future because, if caught, he is unlikely
to be released or even convicted until after the date on which the law becomes effective. With respect
to recidivism, however, these laws have to be operative to work as intended. Our results, it turns
out, are not sensitive to this distinction.
34 Another possible explanation for the increase in crime frequency associated with an increase in
registry size is that either the authorities or the public become overwhelmed with the number of
offenders as the registry grows. This strikes us as unlikely. First, with respect to the police, we continue
to see a reduction in the number of offenses as the registry grows under a registration regime, which
suggests that, although large registries are surely costly, police are not being overwhelmed to the
point that an additional registrant reduces the overall effectiveness of the system. Second, notification
regimes are primarily local. Therefore, most of the increase in registry rolls amounts to an increase
from no registered offenders to two or three in a neighborhood. Citizens are not expected to track
thousands of offenders, and, indeed, notification systems are not designed to work that way.
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sex offenses (.362 offense per 10,000 people; ). However, actually reg-pp .43
istering offenders (absent notification) does reduce crime. The total effect of
registration with an average-size registry (approximately 16 offenders per 10,000
people) is a yearly reduction of 1.21 sex offenses per 10,000 people ( ).pp .07
On the other hand, notification laws appear to be attractive only with a small
registry. Notification precludes an additional .78 sex offense per 10,000 people
per year ( ) when 4.7 offenders per 10,000 people (the 10th percentilepp .02
of registry size) are registered. By contrast, adding a notification law to an existing
registration requirement with an average-size registry has an insignificant positive
effect on sex offense frequency (.144 sex offense per 10,000 people; ),pp .65
although the overall impact of both laws is still a reduction of 1.06 sex offenses
per 10,000 people per year ( ).pp .11
If a state uses both registration and notification, if we assume that registration
and notification must cover the same set of offenders, and if the only criterion
is the total number of sex crimes committed, then the size of a state’s registry
may be relatively unimportant. The positive coefficient on Notification# Reg-
istry Size is similar in magnitude to the negative coefficient on Registry Effective
# Registry Size (the difference is not statistically significant), and so the two
roughly offset each other. As a result, our findings do not support the claim that
expanding a notification law’s coverage reduces crime. Given the substantial
social and individual costs of maintaining a large registry, one implication of
these estimates is that states should employ narrow notification regimes in which
all or most sex offenders are required to register but only a small subset are
subjected to notification.35 Alternatively, states might explore substitutes that are
capable of similar gains in deterrence but avoid what may be notification-related
recidivism. In any event, because notification laws were enacted to reduce re-
cidivism, our results suggest that a reconsideration of notification laws is
warranted.
We also estimate regressions in which we disaggregate our previously singular
notification measure into three different types of notification regimes—full public
access to paper registries, full Internet registry availability, and full active noti-
fication.36 As one would expect, this disaggregation produces less precise esti-
mates, and yet the basic pattern of results does not change. The coefficients for
all three types of notification laws and their interactions with Registry Size have
the same signs (negative main effects and positive interaction effects), and the
standard errors are too large to reject the hypothesis that these different ap-
proaches yield identical outcomes. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the main
effect of active notification is appreciably larger in magnitude, which implies
35 One-third of the states in our sample do not apply their most stringent notification requirements
to all registered sex offenders. Unfortunately, our empirical strategy prevents us from saying anything
about whether these states are closer to a crime-minimizing mix of sex offender policies. Of course,
in the context of our model, limited application of stringent notification provisions may not only
reduce recidivism, but may weaken any deterrence effects as well.
36 These results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 4
Effects of Registration and Notification on Sex Offense
Frequency and Relationship Mix, by Offense Type
All
(1)
Close
(2)
Near
(3)
Stranger
(4)
Registry Effective .362 .017 .195 .088
(.439) (.189) (.187) (.183)
[.43] [.93] [.32] [.64]
Registry Effective # Registry Size .098 .025 .041 .008
(.040) (.023) (.014) (.011)
[.03] [.30] [.02] [.48]
Notification 1.171 .360 .343 .273
(.406) (.142) (.146) (.143)
[.02] [.03] [.04] [.08]
Notification # Registry Size .082 .022 .030 .013
(.032) (.014) (.013) (.006)
[.03] [.13] [.04] [.06]
Mean offense frequency 9.17 3.46 3.78 1.83
SD 9.70 5.58 5.67 3.47
Mean registry size 15.97 15.97 15.97 15.97
SD 11.18 11.18 11.18 11.18
R2 .36 .20 .21 .29
Note. The unit of measurement for the dependent variables is the annualized number of incidents per
10,000 people, and the unit of observation is a reporting agency (ORI)-month cell. Registry Size is empirically
estimated from registry data and is measured as the number of offenders per 10,000 people. Notification
laws represent full access by the public to information on offenders. All regressions control for rates of
assault and other crimes, county income and demographics, and ORI, year, and month fixed effects. Each
regression is weighted by the covered population in each ORI. Bootstrapped standard errors are in paren-
theses, and p-values are in brackets. N p 210,209.
greater deterrence of nonregistered offenders. This result makes sense, as active
notification is perhaps the most intrusive form of notification and therefore may
have particular deterrence value.
In Table 4, we investigate whether registration and notification laws change
the incidence of sex offenses across victim types or, closely related, the equilibrium
mix of offender-victim relationships. As we described above, notification laws
are intended to help individuals identify and avoid involvement with convicted
sex offenders who live or work nearby, and registration laws are supposed to
reduce crime by providing local police with detailed information about convicted
sex offenders living in their jurisdictions. To evaluate the success of these laws
at reducing recidivism, and to probe the consistency between any patterns we
find and the relationship mix predictions of our model, we examine whether
(as lawmakers had hoped) sex offender legislation results in fewer crimes against
victims who might be unaware of nearby convicted sex offenders or who are
otherwise especially at risk because of their proximity to these offenders, and
whether these laws leave crime against other victim types unaffected or perhaps
more prevalent (as a result of crime displacement).
The NIBRS offender-victim relationship variable has one geographic element
(the offender was a neighbor) but is otherwise organized by the level of familiarity
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that the victim has with the offender (for example, the offender was a friend or
acquaintance) or by family ties (for example, the offender was a spouse or
sibling). We use these categories to create three types of sex offenses—close
(involving family members, significant others, and friends), near (involving
neighbors, acquaintances, or offenders otherwise known), and stranger crimes—
that our model predicts should or may respond in distinct ways to registration
or notification. With respect to notification, potential victims who are neighbors
or acquaintances seem more likely to learn from and respond to an offender’s
information being made public than do family members (although perhaps not
in every case—for instance, consider a stepparent) or strangers. Thus, a reduction
in recidivism due to notification should be visible in the frequency of near
offenses. Similarly, registrants may be more easily monitored around their fam-
ilies and in their neighborhoods and more easily located when a nearby crime
occurs. Therefore, registration seems more likely to reduce the number of close
as well as near offenses.
The results of our relationship analysis support these conjectures and reaffirm
our interpretation of Table 3. Table 4 indicates that large registries (without
notification) appear to decrease crimes against victims of the close and near
offense groups but not crimes against strangers. The estimate for victims of near
sex offenses (.041) is highly significant ( ), whereas the estimate forpp .02
victims of close sex offenses is slightly smaller in absolute value (.025) and is
not statistically significant at conventional levels ( ). The estimate forpp .30
victims of stranger sex offenses is, in contrast, small and positive (.008). These
findings are consistent with the idea that registering sex offenders with law
enforcement reduces crime against local victims. Registration does not appear
to protect strangers, but it also does not appear to make them more likely to
be victimized through displacement, as some critics have feared.37
Any deterrence of nonregistered sex offenders by registration and notification
laws should not, according to our model, alter the existing offender-victim re-
lationship mix of sex offenses. In line with this prediction, Table 4 shows no
discernable deterrence effect of registration requirements for any relationship
type and a similar negative effect of notification laws that is roughly comparable
in percentage terms across all types.
Our model provides ambiguous predictions for how the effects of notification
on recidivism by registered offenders might vary across different types of victims.
If notification laws make targeting local victims more costly for a registered sex
offender (increasing ), then we should observe fewer victims of near sex offensescij
but a smaller reduction or even an increase in frequency (if there is displacement)
of stranger crimes. Alternatively, if notification laws instead primarily make life
outside of prison less attractive for sex offenders (amplifying the relative utility
37 We also conducted an analysis that disaggregates offenses involving close relationships into family
offenses and nonfamily offenses (namely, crimes committed by significant others and friends). The
results for both groups were similar in sign and statistical significance to the results for all close
relationship crimes and are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 5
Effects of Registration and Notification on Arrest Outcomes
Arrest
Made
(1)
Time
to Arrest
(in Days)
(2)
Victim
Refuses
to Cooperate
(3)
Prosecution
Drops
Charges
(4)
Registry Effective .0028 1.2475 .0174 .0474
(.0378) (1.8300) (.0133) (.0170)
[.94] [.51] [.22] [.02]
Registry Effective # Registry Size .0012 .0380 .0010 .0048
(.0056) (.1229) (.0012) (.0024)
[.84] [.76] [.39] [.08]
Notification .0190 .8886 .0204 .0004
(.0329) (2.1316) (.0145) (.0213)
[.58] [.69] [.19] [.99]
Notification # Registry Size .0032 .0695 .0019 .0038
(.0035) (.1099) (.0011) (.0023)
[.38] [.54] [.11] [.14]
Mean of dependent variable .23 15.81 .07 .10
SD 23.89
Mean registry size 15.36 14.57 15.36 15.36
SD 10.14 9.69 10.14 10.14
N 287,789 65,702 287,789 287,789
R2 .10 .12 .10 .14
Note. The unit of observation is a reported sex offense. Registry Size is empirically estimated from registry
data and is measured as the number of offenders per 10,000 people. Notification laws represent full access
by the public to information on offenders. In column 2, the sample is restricted to reported sex offenses
that resulted in arrests. All regressions include controls for victim and offender characteristics, victim-
offender relationship, type of sex offense, and reporting agency (ORI), year, and month fixed effects.
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses, and p-values are in brackets.
of crime commission), crime might increase as the registry grows, and if noti-
fication laws do not alter the relative cost of attacking certain victims, any increase
should be spread equally across all types of victims. Table 4 favors this latter
scenario. The estimate for the interaction of Notification and Registry Size is
positive and statistically significant across all groups, and, in percentage terms,
the estimated increases are very close to each other. Thus, although notification
may serve as a deterrence to nonregistered offenders, prompting local victims
to protect themselves against registered offenders may do little to reduce recid-
ivism—and may in fact increase it.
The estimated effects of registration and notification laws on our arrest and
criminal processing variables for all sex offenses are shown in Table 5.38 Although
38 For analysis of arrests and dropped cases, as noted in Section 3, we examine incident-level data
instead of ORI-month aggregates. We also drop the controls for assaults and other crimes (which
are aggregate statistics) and include incident-specific variables in addition to victim and offender
age, sex, and ethnicity indicators; indicators for the type of offender-victim relationship; indicators
for the number of victims and the number of offenders (capped at four); and indicators for the type
of sex offense (rape and sexual assault, sexual molestation, and other nonviolent sex offenses). We
include this broad set of covariates to control as best we can for the information available to law
enforcement authorities and to examine law enforcement performance conditional on this infor-
mation.
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the point estimates in column 1 are consistent with the predictions in Section
3, no statistically significant relationship exists between whether an arrest is made
and any of the legal change and enforcement variables. Therefore, if the decrease
in crime associated with registering convicted sex offenders is indeed caused by
an increased probability of punishment, the response by the offenders to this
new probability must eliminate (in equilibrium) any visible change in the arrest
probability and, likewise, in the time to arrest. The coefficients on the notification
variables on the likelihood an arrest is made show the same pattern. The threat
of being subjected to notification may reduce the number of crimes, but it does
not appear to increase the equilibrium probability of arrest. The estimate for
the interaction of Notification and Registry Size is positive, as would be predicted
by a change in crime due to a relative utility effect, but statistically insignificant
and very imprecisely estimated.39
At a minimum, our analysis provides evidence to support those who argue
that registration and notification laws matter to the frequency of reported sex
offenses. Registration laws seem to reduce recidivism, especially against the neigh-
bors and acquaintances of registered offenders, and notification laws appear to
deter those potential offenders who can still avoid notification’s psychological
and financial costs by refraining from committing qualifying sex offenses. More
tentatively, however, our results also raise the possibility that notification laws
make returning to criminal behavior more attractive to registered sex offenders
by subjecting them to public ridicule and social isolation, perhaps leading them
to commit additional sex offenses.
6. Robustness Checks
Here we address possible concerns about our interpretation and the reliability
of our empirical estimates. First, we explore whether unobserved variables or
trends may account for the relationships we find by ascertaining whether similar
empirical associations exist between sex offender laws and crimes other than sex
offenses. We also examine the robustness of our basic specification and sample
choice. Second, we consider whether our results, especially those that are con-
sistent with a relative utility effect, might be driven by changes in victim reporting
39 With respect to dropped cases, we find little evidence that victim noncooperation is associated
with registration and notification. However, we do discover suggestive evidence that a prosecutor’s
decision to decline a case occurs more frequently in areas with a small registry but less frequently
as the size of the registry grows, at least until the advent of notification in the state. These results
are plausible. Prosecutions may suffer at the start of a registration regime, as police personnel are
used and criminal justice resources are spent on the construction and introduction of the registry.
However, as the number of registered offenders increases, police may have access to more and better
information about local offenders, which leads to stronger average cases. Later, with the arrival of
notification, prosecutors may find that the advantages of registration information to the state become
degraded when community members also have this information, perhaps because of false accusations,
a possibility we discuss in Section 6. The evidence here, however, allows only speculation.
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behavior. We cannot completely rule out this possibility, but we present findings
that seem inconsistent with a reporting-behavior explanation.
6.1. Falsification Tests and Specification Checks
The relationships we identify may be spurious if unobservable factors that
influence crime levels also happen to be correlated with the passage of registration
and notification laws or with changes in registry size. To increase our confidence
that registration and notification are causally related to sex offender behavior,
we repeat our analysis using as outcomes the overall frequency of other types
of crimes—crimes that we believe are far less likely to be affected by the criminal
behavior of individuals who are on the margin of committing or recommitting
sex offenses. These placebo test estimates ought to reveal no statistically signif-
icant relationships between the implementation of these laws and non-sex-related
crime frequencies.40
We examine auto theft, drug offenses, fraud, weapons violations, forgery, and
larceny. These crimes are quite different from rape and child molestation, and
our intuition is that they are neither substitutes for nor complements to sex
offenses, even though a few of them occur with roughly similar frequency. Of
the 24 coefficients that we estimate, we find only two statistically significant
relationships between the reported rates of these six crimes and our four reg-
istration and notification variables (a pattern that might easily occur randomly),
and neither of these estimates lines up with our sex offense results.41 Furthermore,
the inconsistent signs and small magnitudes of all of the placebo coefficients
increase our confidence that our earlier results are not confounded by general
trends in crime. To illustrate, five of the six estimated coefficients on Registry
Size are actually positive.42
Another concern, especially when working with data from relatively few states
40 We note that any relative utility effect generated by sex offender notification might cause reg-
istered sex offenders to commit other crimes as well. Therefore, these placebo tests should not be
viewed as falsification checks in the usual sense, because finding positive relationships between
Notification # Registry Size and non-sex-related crime frequencies is consistent with our model.
Still, we purposefully selected comparison crimes that are very different from sex offenses to reduce
the likelihood that changes in the behavior of registered sex offenders would show up in the overall
frequencies of these crimes. Admittedly, released sex offenders do commit many types of crimes. For
example, among all sex offenders released in 16 states in 1994, subsequent arrests for auto theft
occurred half as frequently as arrests for another sex offense (authors’ calculations performed using
data from U.S. Department of Justice [2007]). However, although released sex offenders are far more
likely than other released criminals to be arrested for sex offenses, they are considerably less likely
to be arrested for the crimes that we consider here. Furthermore, released sex offenders constitute
a relatively small portion of all released criminals, which makes any portion of placebo crimes
committed by sex offenders small.
41 For weapons offenses, we find a borderline statistically significant negative coefficient on the
indicator for whether a registry is effective, but recall that we find no evidence that the existence of
a registry alone has any effect on sex offense frequency (and our estimated coefficient is actually
positive). Registry Size is also significantly correlated ( ) with the number of larcenies, butpp .05
that correlation is positive, the opposite of what we find for sex offenses.
42 These results and the other robustness findings that we describe throughout Section 6 are available
from the authors upon request.
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in a quasi-experimental setting as our empirical strategy does, is that haphazard
changes in one large state might plausibly account for all of our key results (see
Currie and MacLeod 2007). For each state in our sample, we verify the robustness
of our findings to this possibility by reestimating equation (2) on a subsample
that only contains data from the other states we study. Our results are not sensitive
to these exclusions.
Our analysis controls for ORI, month, and year fixed effects, local economic
and demographic characteristics, and contemporaneous crime trends, but it re-
mains possible that our empirical strategy attributes the consequences of some
unknown trend to our registration and notification variables. Up to this point,
we have not included state-specific trends in our analysis because one of our
variables of interest—Registry Size—closely approximates a state trend (see Fig-
ure A1). By partialling out state-specific linear trends, therefore, we effectively
discard important information in an attempt to address possible but ultimately
hypothetical omitted variables. Still, even though we view our earlier specification
as more appropriate, incorporating state-level linear trends can be informative
in this context by showing that alternative accounts for our findings are less
likely to be true.
In Table 6, we present our original results along with results from specifications
that include state-specific linear trends. Our findings are fairly robust to the
inclusion of these trends. In column 3, the magnitude of the main notification
effect decreases but remains marginally statistically significant.43 The coefficient
on Registry Size is also smaller and less precisely estimated but reasonably similar
in magnitude relative to our previous specifications. In column 6, we report
estimates from a log-linear specification with state-specific linear trends, in-
cluding a coefficient on Registry Effective # Registry Size that is similar in
magnitude and statistical significance to our baseline estimate in column 5. The
estimated coefficient on Notification# Registry Size remains positive and highly
statistically significant in every column, regardless of the specification. Overall,
controlling for linear state-specific trends does not change the overall picture
and suggests that unobservable state trends are unlikely to explain the results in
Table 3.
Equation (2) assumes that the effects of registration and notification laws on
registered sex offender behavior (but not on nonregistered offender behavior)
increase linearly with registry size. This premise might be incorrect for at least
two reasons. First, notification regimes with very large registries might overwhelm
potential victims, making comprehensive notification laws less useful to the
public than smaller-scale versions. Second, a large registry might dramatically
43 It is worth pointing out that the coefficient on Notification is statistically significant at the 5
percent level in Table A4, where we restrict our sample to the 13 states that actually passed a
notification statute during our sample period. With the addition of state-specific linear trends as
controls, Table A4’s estimate of the deterrence effects of notification may be more accurate because
it makes less sense to include, as we do in Table 6, the two states (Texas and Ohio) for which there
is no legal variation in registration and full notification in our data.
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Table 6
Robustness of Registration and Notification Effects on Sex Offense Frequency
Sex Offenses per
10,000 People
ln(Sex Offenses per
10,000 People)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Registry Effective .405 .362 .132 .032 .029 .004
(.362) (.439) (.323) (.029) (.033) (.025)
[.29] [.43] [.69] [.30] [.40] [.87]
Registry Effective # Registry Size .081 .098 .065 .006 .007 .005
(.034) (.040) (.035) (.003) (.003) (.002)
[.04] [.03] [.09] [.05] [.03] [.05]
Notification 1.155 1.171 .511 .078 .079 .027
(.369) (.406) (.315) (.028) (.029) (.025)
[.01] [.02] [.14] [.02] [.02] [.30]
Notification # Registry Size .079 .082 .050 .006 .006 .004
(.029) (.032) (.016) (.002) (.002) (.001)
[.02] [.03] [.01] [.03] [.04] [.02]
Controls for assaults and other crimes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State linear trends No No Yes No No Yes
Mean offense frequency 9.17
SD 9.70
Mean registry size 15.97
SD 11.18
R2 .35 .36 .36 .68 .68 .68
Note. The unit of observation is a reporting agency (ORI)-month cell. Registry Size is empirically estimated
from registry data and is measured as the number of offenders per 10,000 people. Notification laws represent
full access by the public to information on offenders. All regressions control for county income and
demographics and ORI, year, and month fixed effects and are weighted by the covered population in each
ORI. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses, and p-values are in brackets. N p 210,209.
overextend police resources, making registration and notification less effective
(and even counterproductive), at least once a registry reaches some threshold
size. We believe that these effects are unlikely to matter significantly in practice.
The world is not teeming with registered sex offenders. The maximum registry
size in our sample is less than 40 sex offenders per 10,000 people, for example,
while the average number of police in the United States during this period was
approximately 20 per 10,000 people (Evans and Owens 2007).
Nevertheless, we explore these concerns with a specification identical to equa-
tion (2), except for the inclusion of two new quadratic terms in registry size:
Crime p a  g  lXjt j t jt
s s s s s D [b Rg  b Nt  (b Rg  b Nt )# RgSize ] (4) j 0 t 1 t 2 t 3 t jt
s
s s s 2 D [(b Rg  b Nt )# RgSize ]  . j 4 t 5 t jt jt
s
This exercise demonstrates that our linear specifications are more appropriate.
The quadratic coefficient estimates ( and ) are extremely small in magnitudeb b4 5
and statistically insignificant, which signifies that their inclusion in the model
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is unnecessary. In any event, our findings in equation (4) for the main effects
of registration and notification and the linear interactions with registry size are
actually significantly greater in magnitude, although they are understandably less
precisely estimated than our estimates in Table 3.
6.2. Reporting Behavior
Like most studies of criminal behavior, we can only examine the frequency
of reported crime, not actual crime, and so it is possible that our findings are
affected or driven by changes in victim reporting behavior. Reporting is a de-
cidedly important issue for the study of sex offenses—data from the National
Crime Victimization Survey indicate that less than 50 percent of rape and sexual
assault victimizations are reported to the police (Rennison 2002)—and especially
for the study of laws that are designed to influence the behavior of potential sex
offense victims.
Sex offender notification laws, in particular, may reduce reporting by victims
who have a personal relationship with an offender or who consider notification
to be an overly harsh new punishment (Iyengar 2009). Alternatively, victims
may eschew reporting because notification may reveal (or be more likely to
reveal) to friends and coworkers their status as victims. Yet these very plausible
stories seem unlikely to fully account for our results, given the effects that we
find for neighbor and acquaintance offenses and given that we find a decrease
in crime associated with registration alone.44 Registration and notification may
also cause offenders to move away from family, friends, and acquaintances to
avoid the accompanying shame or other burdens of these laws. Thus, reduced
contact with registered offenders might explain a reduction in the frequency of
offenses against these groups. However, it seems more likely a priori that this
type of mechanical change in the relationship mix of reported offenses would
be more important for notification than for registration, a possibility that is at
odds with our findings. Finally, a notification law could reduce the frequency
of sex offenses, regardless of the number of registered offenders, if the law
increases awareness of sex offenses in general and makes all potential victims
more cautious. We cannot test this hypothesis directly, but it necessarily assumes
that registration and notification laws influence more than just reporting be-
havior, and our model could accommodate this reaction with a broader notion
of deterrence.
By contrast, changes in victim reporting behavior appear at first glance more
than adequate to explain our finding that broad notification regimes with large
44 Changes in reporting behavior may also generate an underestimate of any crime-reducing effects
of registration. For example, if the existence of a registration system led victims to believe that
reporting a crime was more likely to lead to an arrest, they might have been more likely to report
crimes, increasing the measured crime rate, all else equal. Many victims either knew or learned that
their state had a registry and may have assumed that any assailant was registered with positive
probability. Such a dynamic could account for our positive (but statistically insignificant) coefficient
on our Registry Effective variable.
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registries are associated with an increase in the number of sex offenses. Two
changes in reporting behavior seem to be the most likely candidates. As a registry
grows and law enforcement notifies an increasing number of individuals that
one or more sex offenders live nearby, frivolous reporting of sex offenses might
increase because the proximity of a sex offender is made known and salient to
potential victims, and true reporting of crime that would otherwise have gone
undetected might also increase. Both of these hypotheses are reasonable, but we
find little evidence to support them in our data.
If frivolous reports of sex offenses became more common in response to more
offenders being subjected to notification, holding offender behavior constant,
we would expect to see either a reduction in the likelihood that a report led to
an arrest (because the average case reported has, all else equal, less merit) and/
or an increase in the probability that a case was dismissed by the prosecutor
because, again, the average case became weaker. In our analysis reported in Table
5, the estimated coefficient on Notification # Registry Size is positive for the
prosecutorial dismissal rate, but it is almost exactly offset by a positive coefficient
of similar magnitude for the arrest rate. Furthermore, neither estimate is sta-
tistically significant. Thus, our arrest results do not support a simple frivolous
reporting story as an explanation for our finding that notification regimes with
large registries are associated with more sex offenses.
Another way to examine the reporting hypothesis is to study adult rape and
child molestation offenses separately. Although registration and notification laws
apply uniformly to rapists and child molesters, both kinds of reporting biases
(frivolous reporting or meritorious reporting of previously undetected crime)
seem more likely to occur in the context of molestation. Information that a sex
offender lives nearby may make parents more aware of their children’s behavior
or whereabouts and cause parents to be more likely to investigate their suspicions
than they would have been without the knowledge of a nearby sex offender.
However, mere knowledge that a neighbor is a sex offender seems less likely, all
else equal, to change reporting behavior substantially in the case of a rape of an
adult.
When we separately investigate the effects of sex offender laws on the frequency
of child molestation and forcible rape, which constitute the bulk of all sex offenses
(see Table 2), using the specification in equation (2), we find no evidence of
shifts in reporting behavior. If increased reporting underlies our findings, we
would expect to find the Notification# Registry Size effect driven by molestation
cases. Instead, we calculate very similar point estimates for both types of sex
offenses: .047 for forced fondling ( ) and .040 for forcible rape (pp .01 pp
). As a percentage of the mean offense frequency, the estimated coefficient is.08
higher for child molestation than it is for rape (19.5 versus 12.8 percent), but
the difference is not statistically significant. Overall, although reporting changes
may explain some part of our findings, substantial evidence supports the claim
that sex offenders alter their behavior in response to registration and notification
laws.
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7. Conclusion
We examine the effect of sex offender registration and notification laws on
the total frequency of sex offenses, the mix of offender-victim relationships, and
law enforcement performance, conditional on the report of a sex offense. We
find evidence that registration laws reduce the frequency of reported sex offenses,
particularly when the number of registrants is large, and argue that therefore
there may be benefits to providing information on convicted sex offenders to
local authorities. We estimate that an average-size registry decreases crime by
approximately 1.21 sex offenses per 10,000 people, which is a 13 percent re-
duction from the sample mean. This drop in crime benefits local victims (ac-
quaintances, neighbors, and victims of known offenders, as well as possibly family
members, friends, and significant others). We find no evidence that registration
influences the extent of crime against strangers.
We also demonstrate that notification laws may affect sex offense frequency,
albeit not necessarily as lawmakers intended. We estimate that notification laws
reduce the number of sex offenses when the size of the registry is small but that
these benefits dissipate as more offenders become subject to notification re-
quirements. This pattern is consistent with notification deterring nonregistered
individuals but encouraging recidivism among registered offenders, perhaps be-
cause of the social and financial costs associated with the public release of their
criminal history and personal information. When a registry is of average size,
adding a notification regime effectively increases the number of sex offenses by
more than 1.57 percent.
Although researchers are still in the process of measuring the benefits of
registration and notification laws, the costs have been well documented. A num-
ber of scholars have established the financial, physical, and psychological damage
to registered sex offenders and their families (Zevitz and Farkas 2000a; Tewksbury
2005; Levenson and Cotter 2005). The labor and capital costs to law enforcement
agencies that are required to monitor offenders can also be substantial (Zevitz
and Farkas 2000b). Moreover, there is evidence that these laws create financial
and psychological costs for the neighbors of registered sex offenders. Linden and
Rockoff (2008) and Pope (2008) document declines in property value for house-
holds living close to registered offenders, and several studies find little evidence
that notification alleviates the concerns of the community members who have
been made aware of an offender’s presence (Zevitz and Farkas 2000b; Beck and
Travis 2004, 2006).
The lack of empirical evidence for the recidivism-reducing benefits of regis-
tration and notification has not stopped policy makers from imposing additional
restrictions on convicted sex offenders. Registration and notification laws are
now, in some sense, old technology. Today, states are in the midst of imposing
even more intrusive laws, such as residency restrictions and civil commitment,
with fresh hope of reducing recidivism. These policies may impose even higher
costs on sex offenders and their families than registration and notification laws
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have, and research is needed to understand if the effects, if any, of these policies
on criminal behavior makes these investments worthwhile.
Appendix
A1. Coding Registration and Notification Laws
To build our database of registration and notification laws, we constructed a
detailed legal timeline for each state, relying principally on paper legislative
sources, legal databases containing statutes and judicial opinions, news releases
and stories, and conversations and e-mail communications with state employees.
We catalogued enactment dates, effective dates, and compliance dates for each
legal change and verified, when possible, that such changes took place in reality
and not just on paper. We cross-checked our research with other sources com-
piling sex offender laws and resolved all conflicts. Finally, we recorded the precise
content of these legal changes, which is particularly necessary with sex offender
notification laws because they differ across states on various dimensions.
As noted in Section 2, states invariably began regulating sex offenders with
registration statutes that required that all information on sex offenders be kept
confidential. Over time, however, state laws evolved toward making more of this
information public. Most states began by providing public access to their reg-
istration databases but varied in the restrictions that they placed on access to
this information. Some states (for example, Idaho) only allowed the public to
make information requests in writing or about specific persons. Other states (for
example, Michigan) made information available about all sex offenders in the
area and allowed the public to openly inspect their registries at police departments
or other government agencies. Both approaches to public access assume that
potential victims or witnesses will make use of these opportunities despite their
nontrivial travel and time costs. By the end of our sample period, all states
maintained a functioning Internet registry, and many had enacted more active
community notification laws.
A2. National Incident-Based Reporting System and Demographic Data
Many of the advantages and disadvantages of NIBRS data are described in
Section 4, but we met additional challenges and made additional choices in
constructing our data for analysis. One limitation is that the first year for which
any state’s NIBRS data are publicly available is 1995. Because some sex offender
laws in the NIBRS states we study became effective before 1995, we requested
additional data from the FBI, available for a few states back to 1991, and in-
corporated those data into our analysis. Excluding data from 1991–94 does not
affect our results, however. Another complexity, discussed briefly in Section 4,
is that participation of law enforcement agencies can vary within a state and
over time. Agencies are identified in NIBRS by an originating agency identifier
(ORI), and within each state, the number of reporting ORIs increases dramat-
ically over time. For example, the number of reporting ORIs from Nebraska
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more than quintupled between 1998 (its first reporting year) and 2005. Con-
sequently, we include ORI fixed effects in all of our regressions.
In building our offense variables (sex offense, assault, or other crime) and
our relationship groups for crimes (close, near, and stranger), we found that a
nontrivial number of sex offenses involved multiple victims (8 percent) or mul-
tiple offenders (8 percent). Therefore, the indicators we created to capture the
relationship between the offender and the victim include all offender-victim
relationships. For example, if an offender commits a crime against two victims,
a family member and a friend of the offender, both the family member and
friend indicators are set equal to one. In a separate analysis, we recorded only
the closest offender-victim relationship, and the results of our analysis do not
change. When we examine arrest and other process outcomes, we account for
individual-level victim and offender characteristics with information from the
first victim and first offender listed if the incident involves multiple victims or
multiple offenders.
In addition to the NIBRS information on victims, offenders, and arrestees,
our regressions also employ annual, county-level demographic data from the
U.S. census on the proportion of the population in 18 age-by-sex categories and
five ethnicities, as well as annual county-level data on income per capita, poverty
rates, and unemployment rates. Although some ORIs are smaller than counties,
we believe that these are the best annual data available to control for any de-
mographic shifts that may have occurred within ORIs over our sample period.
For the 2 percent of ORIs that are located in multiple counties, we use a weighted
average of county characteristics based on the population of the ORI in each
county.
A3. Addressing Reporting Errors in the National
Incident-Based Reporting System
We use a multifaceted approach to handle reporting errors in the NIBRS data
that we use. First, we use the indicators provided in NIBRS for whether an ORI
reported crime in a given month. Among ORIs reporting crime during any
month of each year, the fraction reporting for all 12 months ranged from 68
percent in 1995 to 89 percent in 2004. We limit our analysis to crimes that took
place during months when the ORI reported crime in the previous month, the
current month, and the next 4 months. This restriction causes us to exclude less
than 5 percent of the sex offenses that occurred between February 1991 and
August 2005, and all offenses occurring outside of this period.
Despite this initial cleaning of the data, we found many instances of apparent
underreporting of crimes by the agencies included in NIBRS. For example, an
agency might report approximately 500 crimes every month for many months,
report few or no crimes for 1 month, and then return to the previous pattern
of 500 crimes per month. We also discovered agencies that, according to the
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NIBRS indicator variables, started officially reporting on a given month but
actually report no offenses until several months later.
We addressed this kind of misreporting by implementing an algorithm to
identify these patterns and excise unreliable data. First, we took each agency-
period cell, and we calculated the variance in the number of crimes reported
over periods a given length of time from the month of that cell, and then we
flagged (and later dropped) all observations that were outliers given this variance
(that is, the reported number of crimes in that month had a very small chance
of occurring, assuming that reports are normally distributed with given variance).
We repeated this process for reports up to 6 periods away and flagged obser-
vations twice: first, those with 1 in 1 million chances of being observed and,
second, those with 1 in 100,000 chances of being observed. This two-stage process
is helpful because it allows us to recalculate the variance after eliminating very
distant outliers. We also flagged all months adjacent to months with underre-
porting to guard against the possibility that underreporting in 1 month leads to
overreporting in others.
A4. Registry Size Estimates
Our data on historical registry sizes come from various sources. Two reports
from the National Institute of Justice provide us with state registry sizes at the
end of 1998 and 2001 (Adams 2002). In addition, we gathered documents and
other sources posted online by the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children that provide counts of offenders registered in each state at several points
in time from 2003 through 2007. The exact dates on which the states or other
organizations gathered this information vary, but, in general, these data give us
a snapshot of registry sizes in 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2007. We also add data
from news articles and state government reports. Finally, when possible, we make
use of the fact that some states did not apply their laws retroactively and include
a zero at the start of their registries.
Thus, although we collected data on the number of registered offenders in
each state at multiple points in time, there are some periods for which we do
not have information. To estimate the historical registry size for these NIBRS
states, we ran a least-squares regression of registry size on a quadratic function
of date, allowing for state-specific intercepts and slopes and using all data points
available for each state. We then used the predicted values from this regression
as measures of the state registry size for each month. The results of these re-
gressions are depicted in Figure A1.
We combine this state-level information on registry size with information on
all registered offenders for each county nationwide as of August 2007. Family
Watchdog, a private company that provides sex offender information to the
public, compiled these data and provided them to us for research purposes.45
This information allows us to calculate the number of registered sex offenders
45 Family Watchdog (http://www.familywatchdog.com).
Registration and Notification Laws 201
Figure A1. Observations and empirical estimates of registry sizes for 15 National Incident-
Based Reporting System states.
by county in each NIBRS state in 2007. Then, for each state, we allocate our
1991–2005 estimates of the number of sex offenders on a state’s registry to the
state’s counties using the assumption that the fraction of registered offenders by
county today is reflective of the fractions in past years.
A5. Bootstrap Method for Standard Error Estimates
To estimate unbiased standard errors in the presence of a small number of
clusters, we follow Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) and employ a boot-
strapping methodology. Specifically, we repeat each regression in our analysis
100 times and calculate our standard errors using the variance of the resulting
estimates. Let be the estimated vector of coefficients from repetition i. Ourb1
variance estimate is , where2jˆb*
N
21
2 ¯( )j p b  b , Np 100.b* iN 1 i
In the simulations performed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008), this
technique, which they term “paired bootstrap-se,” does not perform as well as
other techniques, such as wild bootstrap, in the sense that it finds a placebo to
have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable at the .05
level in approximately 10 percent of their simulations. However, it is not clear
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from their work whether this difference is reflective of a general result that would
apply to our situation—namely, an unbalanced panel with groups of differing
size and independent variables that have different variances across these groups.
We find that the standard errors calculated using a wild-bootstrap procedure are
smaller than those that we calculate with the paired bootstrap, and so we use
the paired bootstrap estimates to be conservative.
In addition to sampling our states (with replacement) in each repetition, we
take account of any additional bias that might result from our generated re-
gressors by using registry size estimates that are calculated from values drawn
randomly from the distribution of our estimator in the first stage, where we
estimate registry size. Specifically, we take the estimator of the K parameters
from the first stage ( ) and use the Cholesky decomposition of the variance-g0
covariance matrix (V) to draw a new vector ( ) wheregi
1/2g p g  V R , Rp [r . . . r ] ,i 0 1 K
r ∼ independently and identically distributed N(0, 1) .i
We then use this vector of coefficients to reestimate registry size for each re-
gression.
Table A3
Summary Statistics for Reporting Agency (ORI)-Level Samples
1991 Start 1995 Start
15 States SD 13 States SD 15 States SD
ORI population 18,750 38,570 17,207 29,349 19,052 39,503
Offenses (annualized, per
10,000 people):
Total sex offenses 9.17 9.70 9.17 9.87 9.09 9.67
Rape offenses 4.71 6.29 4.68 6.44 4.65 6.25
Forced fondling offenses 3.85 5.88 3.91 6.14 3.83 5.85
Assaults 138.3 116.0 135.8 117.5 136.6 114.9
Other crimes 514.6 338.3 504.5 337.8 509.6 333.1
Registration and notification
laws:
Registration effective .928 .26 .904 .30 .984 .13
Full notification effective .790 .41 .721 .45 .847 .36
Full public access effective .580 .49 .513 .50 .620 .49
Full Internet access
effective .513 .50 .452 .50 .554 .50
Full active community
notification effective .284 .45 .189 .39 .307 .46
Registry size (estimated,
including states with
no registry) 14.81 11.53 14.67 11.75 15.87 11.22
ORI-level demographics:
Per capita personal
income ($1,000s) 28.96 15.40 27.32 16.64 29.85 15.65
Unemployment rate .048 .019 .047 .020 .047 .018
Male:
Age 1–14 .219 .026 .220 .027 .218 0.025
Age 15–29 .218 .043 .218 .045 .217 0.042
Age 30–44 .232 .025 .231 .024 .231 .025
Age 45–64 .228 .031 .226 .032 .231 .030
Age 65 .104 .029 .105 .029 .104 .028
Female:
Age 1–14 .201 .024 .202 .025 .200 .024
Age 15–29 .202 .041 .203 .043 .201 .041
Age 30–44 .225 .024 .224 .024 .225 .025
Age 45–64 .229 .030 .227 .031 .232 .028
Age 65 .142 .037 .144 .037 .142 .037
Black .122 .143 .119 .147 .118 .140
White .798 .149 .815 .144 .798 .148
Hispanic .053 .064 .044 .049 .056 .065
N 210,209 172,231 190,571
Note. Data are aggregated from the incident level to the ORI-month level and are weighted by the population
covered by the National Incident Based Reporting System for the number of offenses, registration and
notification laws, and ORI-level demographics. The size of the registry is estimated empirically using registry
data and is measured as the number of offenders per 10,000 people. Mean registry size is calculated over all
ORI-months, including the months when no law was in place and therefore when the registry size is zero.
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Table A4
Effects of Registration and Notification on Sex Offense Frequency: 13-State Sample
Sex Offenses per
10,000 People
ln(Sex Offenses per
10,000 People)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Registry Effective .361 .297 .215 .032 .029 .006
(.382) (.447) (.338) (.029) (.032) (.026)
[.37] [.52] [.54] [.29] [.39] [.81]
Registry Effective # Registry Size .070 .087 .059 .006 .006 .005
(.035) (.042) (.034) (.003) (.003) (.002)
[.08] [.07] [.11] [.05] [.04] [.04]
Notification 1.118 1.146 .539 .075 .076 .029
(.405) (.402) (.247) (.028) (.027) (.018)
[.02] [.02] [.05] [.02] [.02] [.13]
Notification # Registry Size .081 .083 .056 .006 .006 .004
(.03) (.032) (.016) (.002) (.002) (.001)
[.02] [.02] [.01] [.03] [.03] [.01]
Controls for assault and other crimes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State linear trends No No Yes No No Yes
Mean offense frequency 9.17
SD 9.87
Mean registry size 16.23
SD 11.28
R2 .30 .31 .31 .61 .62 .62
Note. The unit of observation is a reporting agency (ORI)-month cell. Registry Size is empirically estimated
from registry data and is measured as the number of offenders per 10,000 people. Notification laws represent
full access by the public to information on offenders. All regressions control for county income and
demographics and ORI, year, and month fixed effects and are weighted by the covered population in each
ORI. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses, and p-values are in brackets. N p 172,231.
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